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A recent decision made me think that 
it was time to write about what I think 
are some misapprehensions about the 
effectiveness of deeds in lieu of foreclo-
sure. In Hendrickson v JGR Properties 
Inc. 2008 WL 5053440, Ohio Court 
of Appeals, December 2008), JRG 
acquired property on March 30, and 
on April 3, it gave Hendrickson a note, 
a mortgage (probably a junior), and a 
warranty deed to that property, which 
Hendrickson recorded on February 
23, 2007, when JGR defaulted on 
Hendrickson’s loan. 
In subsequent litigation, JRG sought 
to set aside the warranty deed and 
Hendrickson sought to foreclose the 
mortgage. The trial court held the war-
ranty deed invalid as prejudicing JGR’s 
right of redemption, but left the mort-
gage intact, a decision which the Court 
of Appeal affirmed.
That much of the decision is perfectly 
logical and should be widely accepted. A 
deed covering the same property that was 
made security for a mortgage, and given 
at the same time that the loan is made 
and the mortgage was taken is always 
invalid. The contemporaneous deed in 
lieu never works. (Although this lender 
apparently did not know about that rule, 
since it went ahead and labeled the docu-
ment “Agreement Deed Held By Lender 
For Security,” more or less inviting any 
observer to recognize the deed as being 
something other than a real deed.)
It is elementary law that when a lender 
holds a mortgage as security for its 
loan, on default it has to foreclose on 
that mortgage if it wants to realize on 
the security. The equity of redemption, 
i.e., the right of a debtor to pay late, 
can be cut off only by going through 
a proper (“foreclosure”) procedure, a 
requirement that the system has had 
for some 500 years. Even though the 
transaction may have been drafted as 
some kind of conditional fee, a mort-
gagee cannot just take the debtor’s 
property on the instant that a default 
has occurred. 
It did not take the chancellors, who first 
created this right, long to realize that 
creditors disliked that mandatory delay 
requirement and would require their 
necessitous borrowers to waive it as a 
condition to getting a loan. It is there-
fore hardly surprising that the chancel-
lors quickly came up with a companion 
rule prohibiting lenders from drafting 
around the foreclosure requirement—
the rule against clogging—making it a 
necessary counterpart to the equity of 
redemption.
A deed absolute given by the mort-
gagor at the same time and as a 
companion to a mortgage is always 
invalid as a clog on redemption. If 
it were allowed to operate as stated, 
it would allow the lender to record 
the deed on default and immediately 
claim the property, without the incon-
venience of a redemption period or 
foreclosure or sale beforehand. That 
is why the courts will always declare 
the contemporaneous deed in lieu 
unenforceable.
But the situation is not always that 
simple. In Hendrickson case the credi-
tor argued that the court should follow 
another decision it had earlier rendered 
(“Gormas”) which had upheld a deed in 
lieu of foreclosure that had been given 
by a mortgagor after the mortgage had 
been given. (In Hendrickson, the deed 
had been delivered a week after the 
mortgagor grantor had acquired the 
title, but on the same day that it bor-
rowed the money and signed the mort-
gage.) The timing, argued the creditor, 
changed the analysis.
It is true that the rule for contempora-
neously executed deeds in lieu of fore-
closure is not automatically applied to 
deeds in lieu that are executed subse-
quently to the execution of the mort-
gage. Two reasons are often given for 
making this distinction.
One explanation is that the presump-
tion that the borrower is necessitous 
applies only at the time of inception 
of the loan—when the borrower is too 
desperate as to sign anything, and not 
thereafter. This reasoning is not in fact 
very persuasive, since borrowers who 
cannot keep up their already existing 
loans are probably far more threatened 
and prepared to cooperate concede to 
demands, as the recent foreclosure res-
cue scammers well know. 
The other reason is better. A deed abso-
lute executed by a mortgagor subse-
quent to the original execution of the 
mortgage might merely be the mecha-
nism for completing a true conveyance 
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of the property; a step that an owner of 
property is entitled to take even though 
his or her title is subject to a mortgage. 
If the mortgagor is free to sell mort-
gaged property to a third person, there 
is no special reason why she should not 
be equally free to sell it to the mort-
gagee. Sale of the equity by the mort-
gagor to the mortgagee should be no 
more invalid than a sale to a stranger; 
that the purchaser is the lender might 
make a court watchful of the transaction 
but would not lead to automatic invali-
dation, as is the case for the contem-
poraneous deed in lieu (which would 
never be intended to function as a true 
sale). So a deed in lieu that is given after 
the mortgage has already been executed 
may be enforceable notwithstanding 
that one given at the same time as the 
mortgage is not.
The Court of Appeal in Hendrickson 
was unwilling to rely on its earlier 
Gormas decision that had validated 
a subsequent deed in lieu, because it 
was clear there whether or not that 
subsequent deed had been given to a 
new third-party lender who was com-
ing into the picture to bail the mort-
gagor out on an existing defaulted loan 
or given to the original lender who 
was just engaging in some workout 
refinancing. 
That thinking is dangerous, although 
more common than it should be in 
many cases. A subsequent deed in lieu 
is not always valid just because it was 
not contemporaneous (and its validity 
should certainly not depend on whether 
the grantee was the original mortgagee 
or a different third party).
It is true that there is distinction 
between a contemporaneous and a sub-
sequent deed in lieu of foreclosure and 
that the former (contemporaneous) is 
always bad. But it should not be true 
that, conversely, the deed in lieu given 
subsequent to the execution of the ini-
tial mortgage is therefore always good. 
There are two different kinds of subse-
quent deed in lieu transactions and they 
must be treated differently.
When a borrower who is hopelessly 
underwater executes a deed to the prop-
erty to its lender in order to avoid fore-
closure, and both sides appreciate that 
the deal is over, the loan is gone, and 
that they are walking away from each 
other, then that deed ought to be as valid 
as any other deed executed by an owner, 
even though it has been delivered to the 
former mortgagee of the property. That 
is a true sale. Some court intimate that 
the transaction has to be extra fair to be 
upheld, but that is not really good con-
veyancing law; a lender purchasing the 
property of its former borrower ought 
to be as free as anyone else to bargain 
for a good price or good terms, and the 
transaction should be set aside only on 
the same sort of grounds as would upset 
a purchase by an outside.
What needs be scrutinized closely where 
the grantee is the former lender is not 
the terms of the purchase but whether 
it really is a purchase that is occurring, 
rather than merely a refinancing and/or 
extending of the old loan relationship. 
A true sale of the property—whether to 
the lender or to a third party—means 
that the property is not the owner’s 
anymore (and the previous mortgage 
relationship is by definition, over). A 
refinancing of the old loan means that 
the property does still belong to the 
same old owner.
In its earlier Gormas decision, the 
Ohio court had noted that the new 
money that was given to the owners 
was paid not to acquire their title but 
to give them more time to pay off their 
debts. That transaction was not a sale 
of their property, such as described 
in the previous paragraph; the former 
owners remained as current owners 
of the property. They did not say to 
themselves “now we no longer own 
that property,” rather they said “we 
can still keep that property if we can 
later on pay off this new debt.” That 
describes a mortgage rather than a 
sale. That deed the owners gave in 
return for that money was not intended 
to transfer their title away but merely 
to secure another obligation imposed 
against their continued title. Whether 
the money came from the old lender 
or from a new one made no difference; 
the subsequent deed was not a deed 
but a mortgage device, regardless of 
who it named as grantee.
While a contemporaneous deed in lieu 
can be said to always be automatically 
invalid, the question to be asked of a 
subsequent deed in lieu is not so much 
whether it is valid or invalid, but rather, 
if valid then valid as what? A subse-
quent deed in lieu truly given to transfer 
title to the lender and end the mortgage 
relationship should be valid as a deed 
(even if the terms are harsh, so long as 
there is no fraud). But if the instrument 
is given instead as a vehicle to allow 
the mortgagor hold on the land a little 
longer, in return the mortgagee having 
an easier time in taking it away from her 
later on, then its validity—if any—is as 
a mortgage, not a deed.
An executory or conditionally effec-
tive deed in lieu of foreclosure—one 
that is to be recorded or otherwise take 
effect only at a later time if the mort-
gagor fails to properly perform some 
obligation - is just another form of 
mortgage, a mortgage on the equity of 
redemption, whose terms would per-
mit the mortgagee to take the property 
without having to go through a fore-
closure and sale.
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The distinction between a deed in lieu 
intended to function as a deed and one 
intended to function as a mortgage is 
often slippery. It was easy enough to rec-
ognize in a situation like Hendrickson, 
where the agreement explicitly pro-
vided that the deed be recorded only 
if there was a later default. But was it 
the “later” or the “default” feature that 
mattered most? When a deed is deliv-
ered into escrow with instructions to 
be recorded in 30 days, with no further 
explanation, was it intended to give the 
owner 30 days to pack his belongings 
to get out (a true conveyance), or was 
it intended to give him 30 more days 
to solve his problems (like a mortgage 
extension)? Will the outcome depend 
on what each party recollects saying to 
the other about those matters? If there 
is no conditional language in the origi-
nal escrow instructions but the grantor 
has some kind of option to stay in pos-
session or to repurchase, what is it?
And when a court decides that the doc-
ument really is a mortgage rather than 
a conveyance, what is the consequence 
of that determination? Is the instrument 
now invalid, even if it was executed 
under superfair conditions? But if it is 
valid, can it operate as a mortgage that 
does not have to be foreclosed? And if, 
as a mortgage, it has to be foreclosed, 
it contains no power of sale clause (it 
would not dare to include one), so any 
foreclosure would have to be judi-
cial. Or can the mortgagee ignore this 
“junior” mortgage instrument and exer-
cise its remedies against its original 
mortgage or deed of trust, exercising 
the power of sale clause it contains? 
(Hendrickson seems to have been try-
ing to do something like that.) Or has 
the deed in lieu somehow displaced or 
replaced the original? And if the best 
result of having this deed in lieu comes 
from ignoring it, what was gained by 
demanding it in the first place? 
A deed in lieu perhaps works if the bor-
rower quietly disappears after defaulting. 
But if he or she stays to make trouble, 
the lender holding that deed may regret 
that it ever got what it asked for. u
*Roger Bernhardt is a Professor of 
Law at Golden Gate University in San 
Francisco and Editor of CEB’s California 
Real Property Law Reporter.
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